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A REASSESSMENT OF THE  
WICKERSHAM COMMISSION REPORT: 
THE EVOLUTION OF A SECURITY 
CONSENSUS 
ATHAN G. THEOHARIS* 
The principal catalyst to the appointment of the National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the so-called 
Wickersham Commission) in 1929 stemmed from a heightened public 
concern over the increase in crime and the attendant undermining of 
respect for the rule of law following the recent enactment of Prohibition.  
As such, with the public release of the Commission’s fourteen-volume 
report, critical scrutiny at the time centered on the Commission’s failure 
to offer a definitive assessment of the wisdom of Prohibition.  In the 
process, the report’s broader findings and recommendations concerning 
policing practices commanded surprisingly limited attention.  This 
Symposium proposes to remedy this neglect.  Yet, as I shall argue in this 
Paper, there is a need to reassess the Commission’s core premise that 
changes in administrative procedures would solve the problems of 
ineffective law enforcement and abuses of power specifically by 
rationalizing decision making and promoting professionalism.  The 
deficiency in this premise, I shall argue, derives from the Commission’s 
failure to have anticipated the far-reaching changes in the federal role 
instituted after 1936 and in the authority underpinning this changed 
role. 
In this Paper, I shall not assess this core premise directly.  I shall 
instead assess two congressional initiatives that bookend the 
Commission’s appointment: first, Congress’s action in 1907 and 1908 
that led Attorney General Charles Bonaparte in July 1908 to establish 
the Bureau of Investigation (formally renamed the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in 1935), and, second, its enactment of Title III to the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968 legalizing 
wiretapping and bugging.1 
 
*  Emeritus Professor of History, Marquette University. 
1. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801–
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The belated establishment of the Bureau of Investigation in 1908 
marked the abandonment of a long tradition whereby law enforcement 
was perceived to be principally a local and state responsibility.  Indeed, 
whereas the Departments of State, Treasury, War, and Navy had been 
established by statute in the 1790s, the Department of Justice was not 
established until 1870.  And, even though under this 1870 legislation 
Justice Department officials were authorized to “detect[] and 
prosecut[e] [federal] crimes,” they did not establish a discrete 
departmental investigative division in 1871 or in subsequent decades.2  
Instead, on an as needed and temporary basis over the next thirty-seven 
years, Justice Department officials either contracted with private 
detective agencies or the Treasury Department’s Secret Service division 
whenever they required the services of skilled investigators.3 
This all changed in 1907 and 1908.  At this time, members of 
Congress first rejected Attorney General Bonaparte’s 1907 and 1908 
requests to fund a departmental investigative force, and second 
approved appropriation restrictions that precluded Justice Department 
officials from contracting for the temporary services of Secret Service 
agents in 1908.  On June 29, 1908, in response to this latter action and 
relying on the Department’s contingency funds, Bonaparte hired ten 
former Secret Service agents, and then, on July 26, 1908, appointed 
Stanley Finch to head a permanent departmental investigative force of 
thirty-four agents.4 
While steeped in controversy at the time of its establishment, the 
Bureau of Investigation nonetheless soon commanded the public and 
 
804, 82 Stat. 197, 211–25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006)); RHODRI 
JEFFREYS-JONES, THE FBI: A HISTORY 5 (2007). 
2. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 21, 17 Stat. 5, 6 (appropriating funds to supply for deficiency 
in fiscal year ending 1871); Act of Mar. 8, 1871, ch. 113, 16 Stat. 495, 497 (appropriating funds 
for fiscal year ending 1872). 
3. ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, THE FBI & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A BRIEF CRITICAL 
HISTORY 15–16 (2004) [hereinafter THEOHARIS, FBI & AM. DEMOCRACY]; SANFORD J. 
UNGAR, FBI 39 (1976); see also JEFFREYS-JONES, supra note 1, at  3, 5 (2007). 
4. MAX LOWENTHAL, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 4–5 (1950); 
THEOHARIS, FBI & AM. DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at 16–17; TIM WEINER, ENEMIES: A 
HISTORY OF THE FBI 11–12, 453–54 (2012); see FRED J. COOK, THE FBI NOBODY KNOWS 
54–55 (1964); JEFFREYS-JONES, supra note 1, at 5, 39, 50; Vern Countryman, The History of 
the FBI: Democracy’s Development of a Secret Police, in INVESTIGATING THE FBI 33, 35 (Pat 
Watters & Stephen Gillers eds., 1973) (noting there were at least nine full-time investigators); 
Aaron Stockham, Lack of Oversight: The Relationship Between Congress and the FBI, 1907-
1975, 47–48 (May 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University), available at 
http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/111/. 
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Congress’s acceptance as an agency that advanced the nation’s law 
enforcement interests.  Members of Congress, implicitly recognizing the 
new agency’s value in 1910, enacted the White Slave Traffic (or Mann) 
Act and in 1919 the Stolen Motor Vehicles (or Dyer) Act.5  These 
legislative initiatives captured their recognition of the importance of a 
federal law enforcement role, namely that local and state police agencies 
were incapable of addressing a growing problem of interstate crime.  
This altered perception of federal responsibilities quickly commanded 
even wider support first in the wake of the upsurge of violent gangs 
during the 1920s and then in response to a wave of kidnappings and 
bank robberies during the 1930s. 
Public and congressional concerns about a perceived serious national 
“law and order” crisis resurfaced during the 1960s, triggered by that 
decade’s sharp increase in urban crime, urban race riots, and violent 
anti-Vietnam War demonstrations.  In 1968, Congress enacted the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act to expand the federal 
government’s law enforcement authority to address this perceived 
national crisis.6  Indeed, Title III of the Omnibus Act captures this sense 
that the federal government’s law enforcement capabilities needed to be 
expanded by rescinding the ban on wiretapping instituted under the 
1934 Communications Act.  Title III would legalize wiretapping and 
bugging during criminal investigations subject, however, to a prior 
court-approved warrant requirement.  The proposed legislation, 
nonetheless, contained a broad exemption: namely, that the warrant 
requirement shall not “limit” a president’s “constitutional power” in an 
undefined national security area.7  The rationale advanced for this 
exemption was “whatever means are necessary should and must be 
taken to protect the national security interest.”8 
The contrast between congressional opposition in 1907–1908 to a 
centralized police force and approval in 1968 of legislation endorsing 
undefined presidential powers in the national security area pinpoints 
one key reason for the unprecedented expansion of federal law 
 
5. Stockham, supra note 4, at 63–69.  
6. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197. 
7. § 802, 82 Stat. at 213 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c) (2006)). 
8. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 69 (1968); see also ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF 
POWER: HOW COLD WAR SURVEILLANCE AND SECRECY POLICY SHAPED THE RESPONSE 
TO 9/11, 40–41 (2011) [hereinafter THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER]; Stockham, supra note 4, 
at 258–63 (discussing the debate sparked by the presidential exception). 
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enforcement powers and, as a byproduct, predictable abuses of power: 
namely, the emergence of what I would describe as a “national security” 
consensus, one reflected in the transformation of American 
conservatism.  While the prevailing interpretation singles out the crucial 
role of liberal Presidents and members of Congress (notably during the 
Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society eras) as effecting the growth 
of a powerful federal government, this prevailing view missed what has 
been a secondary factor contributing at minimum to the expansion of 
federal law enforcement powers: the shift among conservatives in their 
conception of presidential power during the Cold War era. 
Thus, if we ask the question which members of Congress had 
opposed Attorney General Bonaparte’s requests of 1907–1908 to fund a 
departmental police force and then in 1908 had approved appropriation 
restrictions to foreclose Justice Department officials’ access to Secret 
Service agents, the answer is conservative Republicans and Southern 
Democrats.  Just as conservative Republicans during the so-called 
Progressive Era of 1901–1917 had opposed both the expansion of 
federal regulatory powers and the establishment of executive 
commissions such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal 
Trade Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board, in 1907–1908, they 
had similarily opposed the establishment of a federal police force that 
would be subject to the direction of executive branch officials.  For quite 
different reasons, Southern Democrats—who during the pre-Civil War 
years had opposed protective tariffs, liberal land disposition policies, or 
funding a transcontinental railroad system, and were later scarred by the 
South’s experience during Military Reconstruction—in 1907–1908 
similarly opposed, on states’ rights grounds, the establishment of a 
federal police force that would be subject to the direction of executive 
branch officials.9 
These concerns of conservative Republicans and Southern 
Democrats about the perils that a federal police force posed to limited 
government and to personal and political rights had led them to reject 
Bonaparte’s requests to fund a departmental investigative division and 
to endorse appropriation restrictions that would prohibit the 
department’s temporary employment of Secret Service agents.10  For 
 
9. ATHAN G. THEOHARIS & JOHN STUART COX, THE BOSS: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND 
THE GREAT AMERICAN INQUISITION 42–43 (1988). 
10. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 4, at 3–4; WEINER, supra note 4, at 11; Stockham, 
supra note 4, at 21–35. 
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example, Congressman Walter Smith (Republican, Iowa) pointedly 
asked Bonaparte whether the Attorney General agreed that Congress’s 
opposition was  “evidence of the hostility to what might be called a spy 
system,” while Congressman Joseph Swagger Sherley (Democrat, 
Kentucky) characterized such a force as “not . . . being in accord with 
the American ideas of government.”11  “[A] secret service force,” 
Sherley asserted, “had inherently in it the possibilities of abuse . . . .”12  
Echoing Sherley’s warning, Congressman George Waldo (Republican, 
New York) defined as the central issue: “[W]hether we believe in a 
central secret-service bureau, such as there is in [czarist] Russia to-day 
[sic] . . . it would be a great blow to freedom and to free institutions if 
there should arise in this country any such great central secret-service 
bureau as there is in Russia.”13  Would not such a centralized agency, 
Sherley feared, lead to investigations of the “private conduct of an 
officer or employee of the Government,” and specifically, “if the 
accusation was made against a member of Congress that he ha[d] been 
guilty of conduct unbecoming a gentleman and a member of 
Congress”?14  Alarmed by this ominous possibility, Congressman Smith 
maintained that “no general system of spying upon and espionage of the 
people, such as has prevailed in [czarist] Russia, in France under the 
[infamous police chief Joseph Fouché during the Napoleonic] empire, 
and at one time in Ireland, should be allowed to grow up.”15 
Not surprisingly, Congress critically reviewed Attorney General 
Bonaparte’s unilateral appointment of a departmental investigative 
force, instituted while Congress was not in session and in violation of the 
spirit and intent of Congress’s recent actions, when reconvening after 
the November elections.  Bonaparte at this time confronted a delicate 
political problem of having to justify his unilateral decision and to ward 
off any congressional effort to rescind his action.  President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s public intercession further compounded Bonaparte’s 
political problem.  For, in his annual message to Congress of December 
1908, the outgoing President (who had not been a candidate for re-
 
11. Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill for 1909: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the H. 
Comm. on Appropriations, 60th Cong. 776, 779 (1908).   
12. 43 CONG. REC. 671 (1909). 
13. Id. at 3132. 
14. Id. at 669. 
15. Id. at 672; see also COOK, supra note 4, at 54; JEFFREYS-JONES, supra note 1, at 51–
52; LOWENTHAL, supra note 4, at 3–4; WEINER, supra note 4, at 11; Countryman, supra note 
4, at 33–34, 36; Stockham, supra note 4, at 21–35. 
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election that November) sharply condemned the recently imposed 
restrictions that denied the Justice Department access to the temporary 
use of Secret Service agents. 
The President pointedly described this congressional initiative as “of 
benefit only, to the criminal classes.”16  Had this restriction been 
“deliberately introduced for the purpose of diminishing the effectiveness 
of war against crime,” Roosevelt claimed, “it could not have been better 
devised to this end.”17  Characterizing this legislative action’s “chief 
argument” as self-serving, he posited that “the Congressmen did not 
themselves wish to be investigated by Secret Service” agents to uncover 
their possible criminal conduct.18  The President concurrently defended 
the value of a centralized police force as the most effective means for 
solving crime, adding that any possible abuse could be averted through 
congressional oversight.19 
The President’s criticisms were immediately denounced by these 
same members of Congress.  Their comments captured their earlier 
skepticism about executive power and purpose.  For one, Senator 
Augustus Bacon (Democrat, Georgia) condemned President 
Roosevelt’s comments as “the most deliberate, the most carefully 
designed, and the most skillfully worded insult that was ever sent to any 
parliamentary body by an executive officer, either in this country or in 
any other country.”20  Echoing this complaint, Congressman James 
Tawney (Republican, Minnesota) claimed that “nothing can contribute 
so much to the destruction of this great essential of government or to 
the disintegration of our Republic as an attempt upon the part of one 
branch of the Government to impeach the honor and integrity of 
another branch.”21  Nonetheless, the main criticism of President 
Roosevelt’s comments centered less on his impolitic rhetoric than over 
what Congressman Sherley articulated as Congress’s purpose when 
adopting this appropriation restriction: a principled conviction that “a 
secret service force had inherently in it the possibilities of abuse.”22  The 
House of Representatives, not surprisingly, thereupon approved a 
 
16. 43 CONG. REC. 458 (1909). 
17. Id. at 459. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 458–62; see also Countryman, supra note 4, at 35–36; Stockham, supra note 4, 
at 33–39. 
20. 43 CONG. REC. 315 (1909). 
21. Id. at 660. 
22. Id. at 671. 
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resolution demanding that President Roosevelt document his 
accusations and specifically identify any instances of a member of 
Congress’s criminal conduct when acting in an official capacity.23 
More importantly, these congressional critics directly challenged 
Bonaparte’s independent action during hearings conducted by the 
House Appropriations Committee in February 1909.  Seeking to tamp 
down the controversy that the President’s intemperate remarks had 
precipitated, in his testimony and in his earlier annual report to 
Congress, the outgoing Attorney General (whose term expired the next 
month and who, ironically, was succeeded by George Wickersham) 
defended his decision to establish the Bureau of Investigation as having 
been “involuntary” and as having been properly funded through the 
Department’s appropriations authorizing investigations to detect and 
prosecute crime.24  He had no other recourse at the time, Bonaparte 
protested, having lost access to the services of Secret Service agents.  
Furthermore, Bonaparte contended, a departmental agency would be 
more efficient and “under modern conditions, [is] absolutely 
indispensable to the proper discharge of the duties of this department, 
and it is hoped that its merits will be augmented and its attendant 
expense reduced by further experience.”25  Bonaparte also sought to 
rebut fears that a centralized force would inevitably abuse its power.  To 
the contrary, he argued, “a centralized and accurately ascertained 
authority and responsibility [combined with] a system of record as will 
enable the legislative branches of the Government, the head executive, 
and possibly the courts [will] fix the responsibility for anything that goes 
wrong.”26  Centralization, he maintained, would ensure better oversight 
and thereby preclude possible abuses.  Nor, the Attorney General 
emphasized, would this recently established force be used to spy on the 
“personal conduct” of the citizens, to “dig up the private scandals of 
men,” or for political purposes.27  And, when responding to skeptical 
questioning about executive oversight, he added that such abuses could 
 
23. Id. at 311–15, 645–84, 3122–35; see also Stockham, supra note 4, at 34–35. 
24. 1908 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 7; see Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill for 1910: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 60th Cong. 1006–07 (1909) 
[hereinafter Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill for 1910]; see also WEINER, supra note 4, at 12; 
Stockham, supra note 4, at 48–49. 
25. 1908 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 7. 
26. Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill for 1910, supra note 24, at 1032 (1909); see 
Countryman, supra note 4, at 36; Stockham, supra note 4, at 56. 
27. 42 CONG. REC. 5557–58 (1908) (statement of Rep. Sherley). 
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be averted through congressional oversight.  Pressed as to whether 
executive officials would honor congressional requests for relevant 
records, the Attorney General conceded that the “Senate would have 
the legal right to convict” an executive official who refused to honor 
such requests.28 
All members of Congress were not convinced by the Attorney 
General’s assurances of executive restraint.  Articulating his own (and 
others) deep skepticism about Bonaparte’s assurances, Congressman 
Sherley maintained instead that 
the whole theory of our Government looks to the fact that we 
should have a Government of laws and not of men, and that the 
rights of a citizen should depend not so much upon the wisdom 
and discretion of an executive officer, as upon fixed rules of law 
and of conduct . . . .29 
Nonetheless, and despite the furor created by Bonaparte’s unilateral 
action and President Roosevelt’s disparaging accusations, Congress did 
not then explicitly bar the use of appropriated departmental funds for 
such a force or enact a legislative charter to delimit this newly-
established agency’s powers.  Instead, Congress stipulated that 
appropriated funds could only be used for the “detection and 
prosecution of crimes against the United States.”30  This provision 
governing Department appropriations, however, was slightly amended 
in 1910 to “such other investigations regarding official matters under the 
control of the Department of Justice as may be directed by the Attorney 
General.”31 
During the years 1907–1909, conservative Republicans and Southern 
Democrats had adamantly opposed an executive-mandated police force.  
Ironically, during the 1960s, conservative Republicans and Southern 
Democrats adamantly supported legislation authorizing wiretapping, the 
scope of which was to be left to the discretion of the President. 
In 1934, when enacting legislation regulating the telephone and 
telegraph industries, Congress adopted a section banning wiretapping.  
Despite this prohibition, Justice Department officials at the time 
 
28. Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill for 1910, supra note 24, at 1040. 
29. Id. at 1033; Stockham, supra note 4, at 57–58.  
30. Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill for 1910, supra note 24, at 1048. 
31. Countryman, supra note 4, at 37 (quoting Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-266, 
36 Stat. 703). 
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privately concluded that this ban did not apply to federal agents.  The 
Supreme Court, however, soon struck down this assessment. In rulings 
of 1937 and 1939, both Nardone v. United States, the Court held first (in 
1937) that this ban did apply to federal agents and then held (in 1939) 
that any indictment based on information illegally obtained from a 
wiretap would be tainted and, accordingly, required the dismissal of the 
indictment.32  The Court’s rulings, however, did not lead to the 
termination of FBI wiretapping.  Instead, President Franklin Roosevelt, 
fearing potential “fifth column” threats to the nation as had occurred 
recently in Europe, in May 1940 secretly authorized FBI wiretapping 
during “national defense” investigations.33  Roosevelt’s secret directive, 
however, did not legalize FBI wiretapping.  His directive was based on 
his private assessment that the Court’s ruling applied only to such uses 
during criminal investigations but not to investigations intended to 
anticipate and prevent foreign-directed espionage or sabotage.  
Nonetheless, he (and his President successors Harry Truman, Dwight 
Eisenhower, and John Kennedy) over the next thirty-seven years 
lobbied Congress unsuccessfully to legalize “national security” 
wiretapping.  These efforts finally succeeded in 1968 when Congress 
enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.34 
When drafted and approved by the House, the proposed Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets bill did not include a title authorizing 
wiretapping.  That provision was added during the deliberations of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.  In that Committee’s report on the 
proposed bill and during the Senate floor debate, proponents of the 
wiretapping title extolled the value of wiretapping in advancing the 
nation’s law enforcement interests.  The proponents also cited the 
safeguards that they had instituted to preclude possible abuses.  They 
specifically called attention to the requirement that Government agents 
would have to obtain court-approved warrants before employing a tap 
or bug.  Nonetheless, not all wiretaps would be subject to the warrant 
requirement, the proposed bill included a broad exemption that the 
warrant requirement would not 
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such 
measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against 
 
32. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340–43 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 
302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937). 
33. THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 8, at 27. 
34. See id. at 24–40. 
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actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, 
to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to 
the security of the United States, or to protect national security 
information against foreign intelligence activities.  Nor shall 
anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the 
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he 
deems necessary to protect the United States against the 
overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, 
or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or 
existence of the Government.35 
The Senate report endorsing the proposed wiretaping title indeed 
specified that “[w]here foreign affairs and internal security are involved, 
the proposed [court-ordered warrant requirement system] . . . is not 
intended necessarily to be applicable.”36 
This undefined exception and the attendant discretion to be 
accorded to Presidents became the subject of pointed debate during the 
Senate’s deliberations on the bill.  In both his minority views printed in 
the Judiciary Committee’s report on the bill and during his exchange 
with the floor leaders of the bill, Senator Philip Hart (Democrat, 
Michigan) directly challenged Senator John McClellan’s (Democrat, 
Arkansas) contention that the wiretapping title was “carefully drafted to 
meet both the letter and spirit” of the recent Supreme Court decisions in 
Berger and Katz.37  Wiretapping, McClellan claimed, would be permitted 
“only under strict controls” and “certain carefully detailed conditions,” 
although Presidents would be allowed some discretion when exercising 
their responsibility “to protect the internal security of the United States 
from those who advocate its overthrow by force or other unlawful 
means.”38  Disputing McClellan’s benign characterization, Hart claimed 
that the proposed wiretapping title “leaves too much discretion in the 
hands of a President.”39  Would not, he asked McClellan pointedly, the 
language “‘against any . . . clear and present danger to the structure or 
existence of the Government’” empower a President to conduct 
 
35. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197, 214 (1968). 
36. S. REP. NO. 1097, at 94 (1968). 
37. THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 8, at 41–42; see Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
38. 114 CONG. REC. 11,208, 14,469 (1968); THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 
8, at 41. 
39. S. REP. NO. 1097, at 174 (1968). 
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“unlimited, [unsupervised]” bugging and tapping of right-wing and left-
wing groups and activists, such as the Ku Klux Klan, Black Panther 
Party, draft dodgers, and the New Left?40  Hart specifically pressed 
McClellan to clarify what he understood a President’s constitutional 
powers to be and the limits to such powers.41  Hart’s concerns were 
unfounded, McClellan responded.42  The proposed language, he 
contended, joined by a second supporter of the proposed title, Senator 
Spessard Holland (Democrat, Florida), did not “affirmatively” give any 
power to the President but simply stipulated that a President’s 
constitutional powers would not be restricted.43  “There is nothing 
affirmative in this statement[,]” Holland maintained.44  Congress, 
Holland added, was not foolishly attempting to “negat[e]” a President’s 
constitutional power.45  
Enacted in the waning months of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, 
Title III’s deferential endorsement of undefined presidential powers was 
first employed during President Richard Nixon’s administration.  The 
Supreme Court eventually reviewed one such use: warrantless wiretaps 
installed during an FBI investigation of radical New Left activists. In its 
1972 ruling in that case, United States v. United States District Court, the 
Court rejected the claim that a President possessed inherent power to 
authorize warrantless wiretaps during a “domestic security” 
 
40. 114 CONG. REC. 14,750 (1968) (statement of Senator Hart (quoting S. 917, 90th 
Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 29, 1968))); see also THEOHARIS, 
ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 8, at 41–42. 
41. 114 CONG. REC. 14,750–51 (1968). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 14,751.  
44. Id.  
45. Id.; see S. REP. NO. 1097, at 11–19 (1968) (containing amendments to the wire 
interception and interception of oral communications section of Senate bill 917); S. REP. NO. 
1097, at 27–28 (describing the purposes of the amendments); id. at 66–69 (discussing problems 
with wiretapping and electronic surveillance caused by technological advancements); id. at 
88–108 (discussing Title III of the Senate bill 917); id. at 122–23 (discussing definitions 
contained in Chapter 119 of Senate bill 917); id. at 161–77 (discussing the views of Senators 
Long and Hart in opposition to Title III of Senate bill 917); id. at 182–83 (discussing the views 
of Senator Fong regarding Title III of Senate bill 917); id. at 214–18; id. at 220 (discussing the 
views of Senator Eastland to Senate bill 119); id. at 224–25 (discussing the views of Senators 
Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, and Thurmond regarding Senate bill 917); 114 CONG. REC. 14,469–70 
(1968) (discussing Senate bill 917); 114 CONG. REC. 14,469–70, at 14,708–16 (discussing recent 
Supreme Court opinions regarding police investigative techniques); 114 CONG. REC. 14,469–
70, at 14746–51 (discussing Senate bill 917); see also THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra 
note 8, at 40–43; Athan G. Theoharis, Misleading the Presidents: Thirty Years of Wiretapping, 
THE NATION, June 14, 1971, at 744, 747–49; Stockham, supra note 4, at 259–63. 
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investigation.46  The Court did acknowledge a President’s constitutional 
power to “protect our Government against those who would subvert or 
overthrow it by unlawful means.”47  Nonetheless, it denied that a 
President could authorize warrantless wiretaps of a domestic 
organization or of an individual not directly or indirectly connected with 
a foreign power.  The Court’s ruling, however, left unanswered the 
matter of a President’s “foreign intelligence” powers.48 
In 1978, Congress revisited the issue of a President’s “foreign 
intelligence” power when enacting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.  Revelations publicized by the Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities (the so-
called Church Committee) in 1975–1976 documented the very abusive 
practices cited by Senator Hart during the floor debate over Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.49  The first revelation 
involved an FBI wiretapping operation, conducted at the request of the 
Nixon White House, which had targeted members of the Washington, 
D.C. press corps, White House and National Security Council aides, and 
second-level State and Defense Department employees. Ostensibly 
instituted in 1969 to uncover the source of a leak of classified 
information to the New York Times, this FBI wiretapping program, 
which continued until 1971, soon evolved into a highly sensitive political 
intelligence operation whereby the White House obtained, through two 
of these FBI wiretaps, advanced intelligence about the plans of 
President Nixon’s Democratic adversaries, notably the then-perceived 
front runner for the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination, Senator 
Edmund Muskie.50  The second revelation involved an equally sensitive 
and highly secret program, code named Operation MINARET, under 
which the National Security Agency (NSA), dating from 1967 and 
refined in 1969, intercepted the international communications of civil 
rights and anti-Vietnam War activists whose names had been provided 
 
46. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972). 
47. Id. at 310.  
48. HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 143 
(2009); ATHAN THEOHARIS, THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY: THE FAILED 
RELATIONS AMONG U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 217 (2007); WEINER, supra note 4, at 
312. 
49. THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 8, at 144–45; see supra note 35 and 
accompanying text.  
50. THEOHARIS & COX, supra note 9, at 413–16. 
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by the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).51 
These revelations became the catalyst to Congress’s drafting of what 
became the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.  When 
drafting this bill, members of Congress rejected both the premise that 
Presidents had inherent powers to authorize on their own warrantless 
wiretapping and, as articulated by Senators McClellan and Holland, that 
Congress should defer to the President in the conduct of claimed 
“national security” operations.52  Indeed, both the Senate report on the 
proposed bill and the language of the Act itself repudiated the broad 
language of the Omnibus Crime Control Act’s provision governing the 
President’s authority.53  Proponents of the proposed bill instead affirmed 
that this legislation would constitute the “exclusive means” for any 
interception conducted in the United States.54  Indeed, the 
accompanying Senate report explicitly rejected “the notion that 
Congress recognizes an inherent Presidential power to conduct such 
surveillances in the United States outside of [statutory] procedures.”55  
Thus, while distinguishing between “domestic security” and “foreign 
intelligence” investigations, the Act required that a specially-established 
court must approve all interceptions conducted during a “foreign 
intelligence” investigation of “U.S. persons who are in the United 
States.”56  It further required that Government officials would have to 
seek the approval of this special court by certifying that the target of the 
proposed interception was a “foreign power,” “an entity  directed and 
controlled by a foreign government,” or “an agent of a foreign power.”57  
The bill did recognize a need to safeguard legitimate security interests 
and accordingly permitted the submission of such certification requests 
 
51. Operation MINARET was discontinued in 1973 but only because of the possibility 
of its public exposure.  ATHAN THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL 
SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER TO THE HUSTON PLAN 122 (1978); see also LOUIS FISHER, 
IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE 
REYNOLDS CASE 145–46, 149 (2006); THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 8, at 67. 
52. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,750–51 (1968) (debating whether the bill could possibly 
enlarge the President’s constitutional powers); see also THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, 
supra note 8, at 144–45. 
53. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 STAT. 1783, 
1797; S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 64 (1977). 
54. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 64. 
55. Id. 
56. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 7, 9, 12–15 (1978); THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 
8, at 146. 
57. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 8. 
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to be in secret while limiting the special court’s supervisory role to 
ascertaining only whether the Government had established a foreign 
government connection (and not whether the proposed interception was 
necessary).  The Act, moreover, contained an emergency exception to 
the advance certification requirement but stipulated that in these 
instances the Government would have to obtain after-the-fact court 
approval within twenty-four hours.58 
This premise that Congress should define the limits of federal 
surveillance authority proved to have a short life span.  Responding to 
the traumatic impact of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the George W. Bush 
Administration in September/October 2001 lobbied Congress to enact 
legislation, the USA Patriot Act, which expanded the surveillance 
authority of the U.S. intelligence agencies.59  The premise advanced as 
justification for this massive bill was that the failure of the U.S. 
intelligence agencies to anticipate this attack had been due primarily to 
limitations on their authority.  Nonetheless, at the time Administration 
officials did not ask Congress to amend the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act’s prior court review requirement.  Instead, advised that 
NSA Director Michael Hayden had concluded that “nothing more could 
be done within existing [legal] authorities” to enable the NSA to 
uncover planned terrorist operations, President Bush on October 4, 
2001 secretly authorized a Terrorist Surveillance Program.60  His secret 
order empowered the NSA, and without having to seek and obtain the 
prior approval of the special court, to intercept and record all 
international communications (telephone, e-mail, fax) “into and out” of 
the United States about which there was “a reasonable basis to conclude 
that one party to the communication [was] a member of al-Qa’ida, 
affiliated with al-Qa’ida, or a member of an organization affiliated with 
 
58. 92 STAT. at 1791–92; see also BRUFF, supra note 48, at 143; LOUIS FISHER, IN THE 
NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS 
CASE 150 (2006); THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 8, at 146. 
59. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272. 
60. OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE, (U) UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM, REPORT NO. 2009-0013-AS, 1, 5–6 (July 10, 2009), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/IGTSPReport090710.pdf [hereinafter Unclassified 
Report]; BRUFF, supra note 48, at 145–46; THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 8, at 
158. 
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al-Qa’ida.”61  The President’s order authorizing this program was not 
only issued in secret but its requirement that this interception program 
would have to be re-authorized every forty-five days stipulated that all 
activities carried out under this program would have to be conducted in 
a manner to ensure complete secrecy.62 
At the time, Administration officials recognized the potential 
political problem posed by a presidential decision to ignore the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act’s prior court review requirement.  As 
justification for this defiant action, in a secret memorandum circulated 
internally within the Administration in November 2001, Justice 
Department Attorney John Yoo offered an expansive interpretation of 
presidential powers.  His memorandum explicitly affirmed that although 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) “purports to be the 
exclusive statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for 
foreign intelligence” operations that “[s]uch a reading of FISA would be 
an unconstitutional infringement on the President’s Article II 
authorities.”63 
Three years later in 2004, however, Jack Goldsmith, the recently 
appointed head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, 
privately challenged Yoo’s secret analysis.  For one, Goldsmith sharply 
criticized the “shoddiness” of Yoo’s analysis and its questionable 
“factual and legal basis.”64  His critical assessment, endorsed by other 
senior Justice Department officials, precipitated an internal re-
assessment of the Terrorist Surveillance Program.  A principal concern 
of these Justice Department officials involved a conclusion that “Yoo’s 
legal analysis entailed ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without 
full congressional notification.”65  Goldsmith’s subsequent threat to 
resign (joined by Deputy Attorney General James Comey and FBI 
Director Robert Mueller III) eventually led President Bush that year to 
 
61. UNCLASSIFIED REPORT, supra note 60, at 6 (quoting Press Briefing, Alberto 
Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen., & Michael Hayden, Gen., Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat’l 
Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/
12/print/20051219-1.html (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
62. BRUFF, supra note 48, at 152; WEINER, supra note 4, at 432. 
63. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to the U.S. Att’y Gen. (Nov. 2, 2001), available at https://webspace.utexas.edu/rmc228
9/OLC%20131.FINAL.PDF; UNCLASSIFIED REPORT, supra note 60, at 11; see also BRUFF, 
supra note 48, at 160–78; WEINER, supra note 4, at 432–36. 
64. UNCLASSIFIED REPORT, supra note 60, at 20, 27. 
65. Id. at 19–21, 27.  
14 THEOHARIS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:09 AM 
1162 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:1147 
“modify certain PSP [President’s Surveillance Program] intelligence-
gathering activities and to discontinue certain Other Intelligence 
Activities that DOJ [Department of Justice] believed were legally 
unsupported.”66 
The secrecy shrouding the institution and conduct of this Program, 
which accordingly precluded an independent assessment of its wisdom 
and legality, was first breached in December 2005.  In a fairly detailed 
front-page account, the New York Times publicized the Program’s 
existence and operation.67  The newspaper’s dramatic revelation 
precipitated a somewhat heated public and congressional debate over 
the propriety and legality of the President’s action.68  Nonetheless, 
members of Congress never directly repudiated President Bush’s secret 
and unilateral action.  Instead, after extended debate, and some hand-
wringing, in July 2008 they amended the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act to permit the interception of the international 
communications (e-mail and telephone) of “non-U.S. persons” without 
requiring the Government to obtain the special court’s prior approval 
for such interceptions whenever “a significant purpose of the acquisition 
[pertains to] foreign intelligence.”69  Interceptions of the 
communications of U.S. citizens, however, would have to be based on 
the special court’s prior approval, although that requirement could be 
waived in “exigent” (emergency) situations.  In such cases, court 
approval would have to be sought within seven days.  The amended law, 
in addition, granted immunity from prosecution to those 
telecommunication corporations that had assisted the NSA in the 
conduct of this program since its inception in 2001.70 
Congress’s unwillingness to challenge the Bush Administration’s 
purposeful decision to ignore the court approval requirements of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and then its further decision to 
grant ex post facto immunity to the participating telecommunication 
 
66. Id. at 29; see also BRUFF, supra note 48, at 152–56, 160–78; WEINER, supra note 4, at 
432–36; 
67. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, A16. 
68. BRUFF, supra note 48, at 157–60; see Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 67. 
69. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110–261, 122 STAT. 2436, 2440 (2008); UNCLASSIFIED REPORT, supra note 60, at 31. 
70. See BRUFF, supra note 48, at 160; GLENN GREENWALD, WITH LIBERTY AND 
JUSTICE FOR SOME: HOW THE LAW IS USED TO DESTROY EQUALITY AND PROTECT THE 
POWERFUL 53–97 (2011); THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 8, at 159–61.   
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corporations underscores an important limitation of the Wickersham 
Commission’s report. This limitation derives from the Commission’s 
underlying premise that the sources of policing abuses were due to 
inadequate administrative procedures—deficiencies in professionalism 
or internal rules. Drafted in 1929–1931, the Commission’s report could 
not have anticipated that federal investigations would expand beyond 
simple law enforcement to include a proactive, intelligence approach 
predicated on secret executive directives (whether issued by Presidents, 
attorneys general, or senior FBI officials) and that in turn were based on 
torturous interpretations of a President’s claimed constitutional powers 
in the “national security” area.71 
Dating from the mid-1930s and expanded thereafter, FBI 
investigations were ostensibly launched for the stated purpose of 
anticipating and preventing suspected internal security threats and not 
simply to uncover evidence to prosecute spies, saboteurs, or terrorists.  
These investigations, however, at times strayed beyond legitimate 
security threats to include monitoring individuals and organizations 
engaged in dissident activities or seeking to influence public opinion.  
Nor were FBI officials content simply to collect derogatory personal and 
political information about these suspected “subversives” and, when 
assured that their actions could not be uncovered, leaked information 
whether to sympathetic members of Congress, congressional 
committees, or reporters and columnists.72  Liberals and conservatives 
 
71. On FBI wiretapping authority, see Confidential Memorandum from President 
Franklin Roosevelt to Att’y Gen. Robert Jackson (May 21, 1940) (Wiretapping Uses folder, 
Official and Confidential Files of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover (henceforth Hoover O&C)). 
On FBI bugging authority, see Confidential Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell 
to FBI Dir. J. Edgar Hoover (May 20, 1954) (Fred Black folder, Hoover O&C). Senior FBI 
officials, however, privately conceded that FBI break-ins were “clearly illegal” and FBI 
wiretaps and bugs were “sources illegal in nature.” On FBI break-ins, see Do Not File 
Memorandum from FBI Assistant Director William Sullivan to FBI Assistant Director 
Cartha DeLoach (July 19, 1966) (“Black Bag Jobs” folder, Hoover O&C).  On FBI wiretaps 
and bugs, see Memorandum from FBI Supervisor W. Raymond Wannall to FBI Assistant 
Director William Sullivan (January 17, 1969) (FBI 66-1372-49) (on file with author).  
72. Indeed, the subjects of FBI investigations included not only Soviet agents, 
Communist activists, and suspected German spies but also prominent Americans, some of 
whom were also the targets of FBI wiretaps, bugs, and break-ins.  These included: First Lady 
Eleanor Roosevelt, Illinois Governor and the Democratic presidential nominee in 1952 and 
1956 Adlai Stevenson, Ensign/Congressman/Senator/President John F. Kennedy, prominent 
civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., journalists Joseph Alsop, I. F. Stone, Hanson 
Baldwin, and Harrison Salisbury, authors Ernest Hemingway, Upton Sinclair, and Norman 
Mailer, popular entertainers Frank Sinatra, Pete Seeger, and John Lennon, labor leaders 
Walter Reuther, Harry Bridges, and John L. Lewis, clerks to Supreme Court justices, and 
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might not have known about the scope of these abusive actions that 
were belatedly uncovered decades later. Nonetheless, with the exception 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, they did not act to ensure 
that future “intelligence” investigations would be lawful and would be 
confined to advancing legitimate security interests.  Finally, and 
paradoxically, in striking contrast to their counterparts of the early 
twentieth century (and as well of the 1930s and 1940s), many 
conservatives by the mid-1950s had come to accept (and defend) 
executive-directed surveillance that contradicted their philosophical 
commitment to principles of limited government and the rule of law. 
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